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INTRODUCTION
The core concern of legislative jurisdiction is the extent to which
a sovereign may create or affect legal rights through the lawmaking
process.1 Because a state undoubtedly has sovereign authority within
its geographic borders,2 questions of legislative jurisdiction arise pri-
t B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 2003; candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School,
2007. Sincere thanks to Professors Kevin Clermont and Trevor Morrison for their time,
discussion, and general instruction, as well as Laura Chang, Fang Chen, Laura Klimpel,
April Rieger, Ulysses Smith and the Cornell Law Review for their time and insight through-
out the editing process.
I See Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1587 (1978)
(defining legislative jurisdiction as "the power of a state to apply its law to create or affect
legal interests"). Judicial jurisdiction, a related concept, is concerned with the competency
of a particular court to entertain a particular cause of action. See KEVIN M. CLERMONT,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE 2 (1999). A party may prevail in
court only when both legislative and judicial jurisdiction are satisfied; the cause of action
must be valid in that it is created by duly enacted legislation, and the court must be compe-
tent to adjudicate that cause of action. Cf Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.
764, 813-14 (1993) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (distinguishing judicial jurisdiction, referred to
as "adjudicative jurisdiction," from legislative jurisdiction, called "jurisdiction to prescribe,"
and noting that a plaintiff's claim may be barred if either jurisdictional barrier is present).
For the sake of consistency, this Note refers to these concepts as "legislative jurisdiction"
and "judicial jurisdiction," respectively.
2 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 42 cmt. a (1934) ("Within the
territory of a state, unless the state is limited by a constitutional restriction applying to it
and one or more other states .. . the jurisdiction of the state is absolute .
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marily when a state seeks to apply its law to foreign conduct or actors. 3
Industrialization and globalization have led to countless scenarios in
which these questions arise. For example, the development of elec-
tronic commerce has prompted debate concerning the ability of a
state to regulate foreign actors whose use of electronic media has in-
state effects. 4 It is currently unclear just how far a state's reach may
extend when enacting legislation meant to protect its citizenry.
5
Judicial jurisdiction, a related concept, 6 similarly has had to re-
spond to social and commercial globalization. 7 One might expect
that because both judicial and legislative jurisdiction draw upon simi-
lar constitutional principles, they developed in tandem in response to
national and global integration. This is not the case, however. The
modifying effect that International Shoe Co. v. Washington8 and its prog-
eny had on Pennoyer v. Neff s9 strict adherence to geographical bound-
aries as the outer limits ofjudicial jurisdiction is a foundation of many
Civil Procedure courses; I0 it is also the subject of much scholarship
and debate. Legislative jurisdiction, on the other hand, has attracted
significantly less attention from courts and academics. 1' While not all
issues surrounding the scope of judicial jurisdiction are settled, liti-
3 See Reese, supra note 1, at 1587.
4 See, e.g., Tapio Puurunen, The Legislative Jurisdiction of States over Transactions in Inter-
national Electronic Commerce, 18J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 689 (2000) (discussing
issues arising from national legislation that regulates e-commerce and exploring possible
solutions to the resulting jurisdictional conflicts).
5 For an extended discussion of this lack of clarity and the confusion it has caused,
see infra Part II1.
6 See supra note 1.
7 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 309 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The model of society on which the International Shoe Court
based its opinion is no longer accurate. Business people, no matter how local their busi-
nesses, cannot assume that goods remain in the business' locality. Customers and goods
can be anywhere else in the country usually in a matter of hours and always in a matter of
very few days.").
8 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
9 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
10 To summarize, the Supreme Court in International Shoe read the Due Process
Clause to require an inquiry into the reasonableness of a particular exercise of judicial
jurisdiction; prior to International Shoe, judicial jurisdiction had been based solely on a
power inquiry under which a state's power flowed from its geographical borders. See CLER-
MONT, supra note 1, at 17-19.
11 See Reese, supra note 1, at 1587 ("While almost a plethora of cases and of secondary
writings have been directed to judicial jurisdiction, the field of legislative jurisdiction none-
theless remains relatively unexplored."). Since the publication of Reese's article in 1978,
there has been little exploratory or clarifying literature on legislative jurisdiction. Further-
more, what jurisprudence and scholarship has been written subsequent to Reese's article
has not been consistent. See, e.g., Allen Rostron, The Supreme Court, the Gun Industy, and the
Misguided Revival of Strict Territorial Limits on the Reach of State Law, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv.
115, 116 (arguing that the latest Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding legislative juris-
diction is a misinterpretation of earlier precedent, conflicts with the legal trends of the past
century, and "cannot be correct without rendering unconstitutional a vast number of the
products liability and other tort claims that courts hear every day").
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gants may at least consult a wealth of precedent to frame arguments
and derive guiding principles. States unsure of the limits of their leg-
islative jurisdiction, however, have much less guidance upon which to
operate.
The fundamental question left to states then is this: To what ex-
tent may a state enact legislation to protect its citizenry against foreign
actors whose out-of-state conduct has in-state effects? Should the due
process principles underlying judicial jurisdiction be extended by
analogy to legislative jurisdiction, so that a state may enact extraterri-
torial legislation if there is a sufficient nexus between the legislating
state and the legislation's target? If due process principles are so ex-
tended to legislative jurisdiction, would they nevertheless present a
broader limit on legislative jurisdiction than they would on judicial
jurisdiction?
In addressing these questions, it will be helpful to consider the
following example taken from a recent case in the District of Colum-
bia. 12 A consortium of gun manufacturers challenged the constitu-
tionality of a D.C. statute that rendered the manufacturers vulnerable
to significant liability.' 3 The statute, known as the Strict Liability Act
(SLA), 14 granted D.C. residents who were victims of semiautomatic-
gun violence a strict liability right of action against the guns' manufac-
turers in D.C. courts.' 5 Importantly, since the District of Columbia
expressly prohibited the manufacture or sale (absent a valid registra-
tion certificate) of firearms within its borders while the statute was in
force, all potential defendants and their conduct were necessarily
"foreign."16
12 Dist. of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 872 A.2d 633 (D.C. 2005) (en banc), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 399 (2005). The District of Columbia is not a state, but the District's
legislative powers equal those of the various states. The Constitution grants Congress the
power to "exercise exclusive Legislation" over the District of Columbia. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 17. However, in 1973 Congress delegated the bulk of its authority to exercise legis-
lative jurisdiction over the District to the District itself when it passed the District of Colum-
bia Home Rule Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified as amended at D.C.
CODE §§ 1-201-207.72 (2001)). This grant of authority was "subject to all the restrictions
and limitations imposed upon the states" by Article 1, §10 of the Constitution. D.C. CODE
§ 1-203.02.
13 Beretta, 872 A.2d at 651.
14 Officially, the statute is called the District of Columbia Assault Weapons Manufac-
turing Strict Liability Act, D.C. CODE §§ 7-2551.01-.03.
15 Id. § 7-2551.02. The District of Columbia itself is also a viable plaintiff and can seek
subrogated damages stemming from the costs incurred by responding to and treating vic-
tims of gun violence. See Beretta, 872 A.2d at 653 (citing D.C. CODE § 4-602(a), which grants
the District "an independent, direct cause of action against [a] third party for the un-
reimbursed value or cost of . . .health-care assistance" whenever the District has "pro-
vide[d] health-care assistance to a beneficiary who has suffered an injury or illness under
circumstances creating liability in [that] third party").
16 See D.C. CODE §§ 7-2502.01-.02 (prohibiting the sale of any firearm within the Dis-
trict of Columbia to any person or organization unless the person or organization holds a
2007]
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The gun manufacturers challenged the constitutionality of the
SLA on several grounds. Fundamentally, they argued that the SLA
was an impermissible attempt by the District of Columbia to project its
policy choices onto the national marketplace in violation of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution.1 7 Although both clauses limit a state's ability to enact
extraterritorial legislation, this Note will focus on the Due Process
Clause for two main reasons. First, the dormant Commerce Clause is
a narrower restriction on legislative jurisdiction because it is con-
cerned only with legislation that has commercial consequences.' 8
The Due Process Clause, on the other hand, presents a limiting princi-
ple for all extraterritorial legislation.1 9 Second, an analytical frame-
work for dormant Commerce Clause challenges already exists.
20
valid registration certificate); id. § 7-2504.01 (a) (prohibiting the manufacture of any fire-
arm within the District of Columbia). The District of Columbia allows limited sales to and
possession by individuals such as law enforcement officers and military officials; weapons so
sold are exempted from the SLA. See id. §§ 7-2502.01-.02. The principles governing legis-
lative jurisdiction apply similarly to both federal authority over international actors and
state authority over actors from other states and overseas. Accordingly, this Note will use
"foreign" generally to refer to the citizens or corporations of a sister state, although the
due process principles evaluated in this Note could be applied in the international context
as well. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 101 cmt. d (1987) ("Unless otherwise indicated, 'international law' as used in this Re-
statement is law that applies to states and international (intergovernmental) organizations
generally."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 10 (1971) ("The rules in the
Restatement of this Subject apply to cases with elements in one or more States of the
United States and are generally applicable to cases with elements in one or more foreign
nations."). There are instances in which international choice of law questions will be
treated differently than interstate choice of law questions, however. See id. For one such
example, see Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federal-
ism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 984-85 (2002) (contrasting the ability of states versus nations
to criminally prosecute citizens for extraterritorial acts, noting that "[f]ederal relations to
other nations are simply not the same as relations between states that are bound by the
comity imposed by the constitution").
17 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-9, Beretta, U.S.A. Corp. v. Dist. of Columbia,
126 S. Ct. 399 (2005) (mem.) (No. 05-118).
18 The dormant Commerce Clause limits "the power of a state to legislate in areas of
interstate commerce when Congress has remained silent." Peter C. Felmly, Comment, Be-
yond the Reach of States: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Extraterritorial State Regulation, and the
Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV. 467, 468 (2002).
19 This is not necessarily the case; it is, however, one of this Note's central arguments.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment literally requires only that states
not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. The clause has been read more expansively in the context
of judicial jurisdiction, however, to address both individual fairness and federalism con-
cerns. See infra note 43. If the clause is constructed similarly in the contexts of both judi-
cial and legislative jurisdiction, as this Note argues it should, it would place a broader limit
on states' legislative jurisdiction because it would encompass all federalism concerns, not
just those related to interstate commerce. For a detailed argument advancing the Due
Process Clause as the most relevant constitutional limit on legislative jurisdiction, see infra
Part I.A.
20 See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573, 578 (1986) ("This Court has adopted what amounts to a two-tiered approach to ana-
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Furthermore, this Note is limited in scope to the legislative jurisdic-
tion issue posed in Beretta-specifically, to what extent may state tort
legislation target actors who performed conduct in sister states. Issues
concerning power to prescribe legislation having international extra-
territorial impact, while relevant and ripe, are beyond the scope of
this Note.
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of legislative jurisdic-
tion, discussing one scholar's attempt to formulate a coherent balanc-
ing approach to analyzing extraterritorial legislation and describing
recent Supreme Court precedent that has been read as imposing new
limits on extraterritorial tort legislation. Part II discusses the merits of
District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp. to illustrate how litigants have
employed recent Supreme Court precedent to argue against interest
balancing and in favor of strict territorial limits on legislative jurisdic-
tion. Part III highlights the negative consequences arising from the
present confusion over legislative jurisdiction and introduces possible
solutions to the problem. Finally, Part III advocates the adoption of
an interest-balancing framework for Due Process challenges to legisla-
tive jurisdiction while at the same time recognizing the need for au-
thoritative principles to guide interest-balancing.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that the Supreme
Court denied the gun manufacturers' petition for certiorari in Octo-
ber 200521 likely because of pending federal legislation specifically
targeting the SLA.2 2 Indeed, Congress passed the Protection of Law-
ful Commerce in Arms Act the month the Court denied certiorari.23
Although it is unlikely the Court will weigh in on the constitutional
questions posed by Beretta in the immediate future, the case continues
to be an important illustration of the legislative jurisdiction questions
lyzing state economic regulation under the Commerce Clause. When a statute directly
regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state
economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute
without further inquiry. When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on interstate
commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether the State's interest is
legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local bene-
fits." (internal citations omitted)). As this Note argues infra Part I.B, recent Supreme
Court cases have caused confusion over what role the Due Process Clause plays in legisla-
tive jurisdiction and, correspondingly, how due process challenges to legislative jurisdic-
tion should be analyzed.
21 Beretta, U.S.A. Corp. v. Dist. of Columbia, 126 S. Ct. 399 (2005) (mem.).
22 See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Court Puts Off Hamdan Appeal, SCOTUSbIog, Oct. 3,
2005, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2005/10/02-week ("The Court
refused to defer acting on [Beretta] while Congress considers [a bill that overturns the D.C.
court's decision and bars such lawsuits].").
23 See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7901-7903 (2006).
In addition to prohibiting all future actions against gun manufacturers for harm inflicted
by criminal third parties, see id. § 7902(a), Congress dismissed all pending actions, see id.
§ 7902(b).
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explored in this Note-questions that affect product manufacturers in
a variety of industries.
24
I
OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATrvE JURISDICTION
A. Legislative Jurisdiction Defined: A Theoretical Background
and the Reese Framework
The scope of legislative jurisdiction has ebbed and flowed since
the nineteenth century perhaps due to courts' changing beliefs about
state sovereignty and the fact-specific content of the legislation at issue
in various cases.25 Nevertheless, one may derive certain first-order
principles from the sometimes conflicting jurisprudence and scholar-
ship in this area. Fundamentally, legislative jurisdiction refers to "the
authority of a state to make its laws applicable to particular conduct,
relationships, or status." 26 Furthermore, "unless a state possesses legis-
lative jurisdiction over the issue in question, its law may not properly
be selected by choice of law analysis.
'" 27
Over which issues, then, will states possess legislative jurisdiction?
There is no doubt that a state possesses legislative jurisdiction over
purely intrastate affairs. A state "can exercise legislative jurisdiction
with respect to all persons and things subject to its jurisdiction,"28 and
" [w] ithin the territory of a state, unless the state is limited by a consti-
tutional restriction applying to it and one or more other states, as the
Constitution of the United States, the jurisdiction of the state is abso-
24 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 7 ("This case presents
important and recurring questions of constitutional law that are not limited to the firearms
context, but apply to all product manufacturers engaged in interstate commerce."); see also
id. at 18 (arguing that legislation similar to the SLA could affect automobile
manufacturers).
25 Compare BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568-75 (1996) (imposing a
flat restriction on states' ability to award punitive damages on extraterritorial conduct),
with F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-70 (2004) (adopting
a balancing test for extraterritorial application of antitrust law).
26 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CML LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 491 (3d
ed. 1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 401 (1987), which defines legislative jurisdiction as the authority of a state to "make its
law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in
things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regula-
tion, or by determination of a court").
27 BORN, supra note 26, at 491 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 9 cmt. b (1971), which states that "[a]t least two things are implied when the local law of
a state is applied to create or affect local interests. The first is that the state has jurisdiction
to apply its local law. The second may be either that the state is the state of the applicable
law under choice-of-law principles, or, when the applicability of a statute of the forum is
the point in issue, that a proper construction of the statute leads to its application in the
given case").
28 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 62 (1934).
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lute." 29 Persuasive authority suggests that a state may also exercise leg-
islative jurisdiction over foreign conduct that has consequences within
its boundaries, 30 although a state exercising jurisdiction on this
ground would be limited by applicable constitutional restrictions.3'
The extent to which the Supreme Court will accept such effects-based
jurisdiction for extraterritorial tort legislation and the constitutional
provisions on which the Court might rely in doing so are the funda-
mental questions posed by this Note.
The precise constitutional source of restrictions on legislative ju-
risdiction is subject to debate. Recent challenges to states' extraterri-
torial legislation, including Beretta,32 cite the dormant Commerce
Clause as a constitutional limit on legislative jurisdiction. 3 3 Other ar-
guments advance the Full Faith and Credit Clause as the true constitu-
tional limit on legislative jurisdiction. 34 This Note argues, in accord
with several scholars who have treated the subject,35 that while the
dormant Commerce Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause are
relevant to the scope of legislative jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause
most completely defines its boundaries.
The dormant Commerce Clause certainly restricts a state's legisla-
tive authority, but its restrictions target only the means by which a
state's legislation regulates conduct and not the conduct itself. In
other words, legislation that violates the dormant Commerce Clause
does not necessarily exceed a state's legislative jurisdiction; the state
may be able to enact alternative legislation that achieves the same re-
sult without violating the dormant Commerce Clause. 36 On the other
hand, a state may never enact legislation targeting particular conduct
29 Id. § 42 cmt. a.
30 See id. § 65 cmt. a ("A state may impose a liability upon any person whose conduct
produces consequences within the state. Thus, one who does an act in one state which
causes injury to a person in another state is subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the
second state for harm so caused to the person in that state. Under the rule stated in § 64,
he is also subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the state in which his acts are
performed.").
31 See id. § 42 cmt. a.
32 872 A.2d 633 (D.C. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 399 (2005).
33 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 9.
34 See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in
Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 94 (1976); James A. Martin, Constitutional Limitations on
Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 185 (1976) (arguing that because the Full Faith and
Credit Clause "incorporates established concepts of mutual respect among sovereigns," it
"provides a better analytical aid than reference to due process concepts" in understanding
leading cases in the area).
35 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT1" OF LAWS § 9 (1971); Reese, supra note
1, at 1587-91.
36 See Bradley W. Joondeph, Rethinking the Role of the Dormant Commerce Clause in State
Tax Jurisdiction, 24 VA. TAX. REv. 109, 128-29, 131-32 (2004) (arguing that extraterritorial-
ity itself does not offend the Commerce Clause).
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if the state and the targeted conduct lack sufficient nexus.37 Accord-
ingly, the dormant Commerce Clause does not sufficiently address all
of the fairness concerns relevant to legislative jurisdiction.
While the dormant Commerce Clause does not restrict all exer-
cises of legislative jurisdiction, the Full Faith and Credit Clause might
thrust too broadly when it comes to restricting legislative jurisdiction.
Professor Willis Reese argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
an affirmative command that cannot be the governing principle of
legislative jurisdiction because if it were it would "obscure[ ] two other
roles that full faith and credit is properly called upon to play."38 To
be sure, the Due Process Clause does work beyond limiting legislative
jurisdiction; however, the Due Process Clause's other imperatives are
similarly negative limitations on the extent of state power. The Full
Faith and Credit Clause, on the other hand, provides an affirmative
command that more appropriately informs a choice of law inquiry.
Accordingly, a Due Process analysis might be most appropriate to de-
termine which states' laws constitutionally could control a matter,
while a Full Faith and Credit analysis might be most appropriate to
determine which of those laws actually will control the matter.
That due process reaches both fairness and federalism concerns
is not a logical necessity. The text of the Due Process Clause seems
only to be concerned with protecting the life, liberty, and property of
individuals; it does not mention safeguarding state sovereignty.3 9 Yet
courts have read the Clause more expansively in the context of judi-
cial jurisdiction, 40 and Reese contends that there is no reason to read
37 See Reese, supra note 1, at 1591-94 (noting that there is no precise formulation of a
nexus requirement in the legislative jurisdiction context akin to International Shoe's "mini-
mum contacts" standard for nexus inquiries in the judicial jurisdiction context and sug-
gesting that nexus inquiries in the legislative context should encompass an analysis of the
legislating state's interests, sister states' interests, and federal system values); see also RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402-403 (1987)
(offering a list of eight factors relevant to determining whether a sufficient nexus exists
between a legislating state and the legislation's targeted conduct); infra notes 42-56 and
accompanying text (providing more detail on Reese's articulation of the fairness concerns
essential to nexus in the legislative jurisdiction context).
38 Id. at 1590. These two additional roles are (1) to limit a state's ability to close its
courts' doors to claims arising under the law of a sister state, and (2) to compel the applica-
tion of a particular state's law when due process would allow for the application of the law
of any one of several states. See id.; see also Martin, supra note 34 (advancing the Full Faith
and Credit Clause as the controlling constitutional provision). For a more complete treat-
ment of the role that the Full Faith and Credit Clause plays in legislative jurisdiction juris-
prudence, see BORN, supra note 26, at 525-37.
39 See Reese, supra note 1, at 1587 ("On its face, due process would appear to be
concerned only with the protection of the life, liberty, and property of individuals rather
than with the interests of states.").
40 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (not-
ing that "the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment" (citation omit-
ted)); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (finding due process restrictions "a
556 [Vol. 92:549
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the language more narrowly when considering its application to legis-
lative jurisdiction. 41 Reese thus argues that the Due Process Clause
serves a two-fold purpose in limiting legislative jurisdiction analogous
to the Clause's purpose in limiting judicial jurisdiction: to protect in-
dividuals from being unfairly subjected to laws and to further inter-
state values.
42
The first requirement of Reese's two-part test-that application
of a state's law be fair to the parties involved-is "clearly compre-
hended within the literal language of the due process clause,"43 al-
though Reese finds subtle distinctions between the fairness inquiry in
the judicial and the legislative settings.44 While the fairness inquiry in
the judicial setting focuses on convenience to the parties and the eco-
nomic burden imposed by litigating in a particular forum, fairness
concerns in the legislative context are those of "reliance and expecta-
tion, whether a party has acted in justifiable reliance upon the applica-
tion of a given law or at least with the reasonable expectation that his
contract or other transaction would be held valid and effective and
would not be stricken down by the application of some unforeseen
law." 45
Reese offers various scenarios to illustrate a one-dimensional
spectrum of fairness concerns. 46 At one end of the spectrum, there is
the patently unfair attempt by a state to assert its legislative authority
over an individual for conduct that took place in a sister state, was
required by the sister state, and for which the individual could not
reasonably foresee any effects outside of the sister state.47 A scenario
under which extraterritorial application of a state's laws is logically
fairer is a state imposing its law upon a foreign citizen for conduct that
occurred in a sister state, was consciously designed to be lawful in the
state where it occurred but nevertheless had foreseeable negative con-
sequences in the legislating state.48 Reese suggests that subjecting the
foreign citizen to the differing laws of another state might "disappoint
[the foreign citizen's] expectations" given his conscious effort to act
lawfully in the state where the conduct occurred, but the fairness con-
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States" when applying
the "minimal contacts" test). But see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474
(1985) ("[Tlhe Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield to
avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed.").
41 Reese, supra note 1, at 1587-89.
42 See id. at 1589 (defining "interstate system values" as values "that work for the good
of the interstate or international systems").
43 Id. at 1592-93.
44 See id. at 1595.
45 Id.
46 See id.
47 See id. (stating that "[s]o far as is known, there has been no case of this sort").
48 See id. at 1595-96.
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cerns at the heart of due process would still exist if the foreign citizen
had intended or should have foreseen that his conduct would have
effects outside the state in which he was acting.
49
The second step of Reese's test balances the interests of all states
who either are parties to or otherwise have a stake in the litigation.
The purpose of this inquiry is to prevent one state's law from unduly
impinging upon another state's interests. 50 Addressing this federal-
ism step in turn involves a two-fold analysis. 51 First, one must ask
whether applying the law of the state in question furthers any of that
state's interests or policies. Second, to what extent would applying
that state's laws impinge upon the interests and policies of another
state?
52
Whereas the fairness inquiry consisted of one axis ranging from
unfair to fair, Professor Reese visualizes the federalism inquiry as a
two-dimensional chart with an X and a Y axis, with one axis represent-
ing the interest of the legislating state and the other representing the
level of impingement upon the interests of other states.5 3 At one ex-
treme, the legislating state has a high interest in applying its law, and
the law's application would not adversely affect any other states. 54 At
the opposite extreme, a state has no interest in applying its law, while
the law's application would severely impinge other states' interests.
55
In between the extremes lie realistic situations wherein the legislating
state and its sister states each have interests that conflict in varying
degrees.
5 6
49 See id. at 1596.
50 See id. at 1599-1607. Comity among the states and sovereignty are among the inter-
ests to be considered when determining this second, federalism-focused step of the legisla-
tive jurisdiction analysis. See id. at 1602 (" [T]he question will usually be whether such an
application [of the sister state's law] would extend beyond the reasonable scope of the
state's regulatory power or, otherwise stated, would entail too great a sacrifice of the inter-
ests of other states."). These considerations contribute to Reese's argument that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause is not a sufficient constitutional source for legislative jurisdiction.
Whereas that clause requires consideration of only a limited subset of state interests, a
broad reading of the Due Process Clause, strongly suggested by the settled understanding
of due process within the adjudicatory judicial context, necessarily requires consideration
of a larger set of conceivable state interests. See supra text accompanying note 39.
51 See Reese, supra note 1, at 1599-1601.
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 See id. at 1601 (citing as two examples of this scenario situations in which all the
states involved have the same rule on the subject, or situations in which, although the states
involved have different rules, the purpose or policy underlying only one of the rules would
be served by applying it in a given situation).
55 See id. at 1599-1600.
56 See id. at 1601-06.
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B. The Supreme Court on Legislative Jurisdiction and
Extraterritoriality
The principle of strict territorialism controlled early Supreme
Court jurisprudence governing jurisdiction. 57 Joseph Story's influen-
tial commentary detailed the prevailing view in the nineteenth cen-
tury that each nation or state has exclusive sovereignty and
jurisdiction within its geographic territory and no farther.58 This un-
derstanding of territorialism drove the Court's early articulation of
due process limitations on judicial jurisdiction. 59 The Supreme Court
held in its landmark Pennoyer v. Neff decision 6 that each state's judi-
cial jurisdiction over any class of persons and things was limited geo-
graphically because of the "elementary principle[ ] that the laws of
one State have no operation outside of its territory."
6'
With regard to legislative jurisdiction, early Court decisions rou-
tinely invalidated the application of state laws to extraterritorial con-
duct.62 For example, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,63 the Court struck down
Louisiana's attempt to punish its citizens for making offensive insur-
ance contracts in New York and held that "[the state's] power does
not and cannot extend to prohibiting a citizen from making con-
tracts ... outside of the limits and jurisdiction of the state."64 Twelve
years after Allgeyer, the Court required state statutes to be strictly con-
strued because of the "general and almost universal rule" that conduct
can be regulated only by the sovereign controlling a particular geo-
graphic location. 65
When considering the limits of both judicial and legislative juris-
diction, the Court resisted any approach that balanced interests or
57 See Kreimer, supra note 16, at 979 ("Within a decade after the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's adoption in 1868, the Supreme Court began to read the territorial restrictions on
state sovereignty into the definition of due process."); Rostron, supra note 11, at 123-24
("In the nineteenth century, the dominant principle overriding all questions ofjurisdiction
was that each state had authority over everything that occurred inside its territorial borders
and nothing beyond them.").
58 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 19-22 (1834).
59 See CLERMONT, supra note 1, at 6 ("Prompted by the tensions among states in a
federation, however, America early adopted a theory of exclusive power based on territori-
ality .... ").
60 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
61 Id. at 722.
62 See, e.g., Rostron, supra note 11, at 124 ("Courts construed statutes as having no
extraterritorial application, citing the 'general and almost universal rule' that conduct
must be governed wholly by the law of the territory in which it occurs.").
63 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
64 Id. at 591. The Court later foresaw the future demise of strict territorial limits on
legislative jurisdiction, however, as it subsequently held that "[a]cts done outside ajurisdic-
tion, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it" could constitu-
tionally be subject to prosecution in that jurisdiction. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280,
285 (1911).
65 See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
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questioned the fairness of extraterritorial litigation.6 6 Rather, at the
turn of the century, the Court framed the issue as a one-part test: Did
the conduct in question occur within a state's borders? If the answer
was "no," then neither judicial nor legislative jurisdiction existed.
6 7
Strict territorialism in the judicial jurisdiction context did not en-
dure the marked rise of interstate commerce, however. In 1945, the
Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington68 considered the exten-
sion of traditional conceptions of personal jurisdiction to corpora-
tions.69 Chief Justice Harlan Stone, writing for the majority, noted
that a corporation is a legal fiction whose physical presence can be
determined only by "activities carried on in its behalf by those who are
authorized to act for it."7 ° Thus, as regards corporations, "presence
within the territorial jurisdiction of [a] court [that] was prerequisite
to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him" under Pennoyer
was no longer feasible. 7' Under International Shoe, "due process re-
quires only that in order to subject a defendant to judgment in per-
sonam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "72
Professor Reese noted, in 1978, that despite defining in Interna-
tional Shoe due process as it related to judicial jurisdiction, the Court
had "not yet attempted to define what principle underlies legislative
jurisdiction. ' 73 As a result, territorialism continued to guide courts'
legislative jurisdiction decisions. However, the Court in Richards v.
United States,74 decided in 1962, cast doubt on the endurance of strict
territorialism in the legislative setting when it stated that "[w]here
more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact with the activ-
ity in question, the forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed
by the States involved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of
the case the law of one or another state having such an interest in the
multistate activity." 75 Professor Reese recounts the difficulty that com-
mentators have had in deriving workable principles from this lan-
66 See Rostron, supra note 11, at 124 (noting the Court's "quintessential" articulation
of territorialism in Pennoyer, which limited a state's ability to exercise jurisdiction only over
persons or things within its borders).
67 See id. ("[C] ourts developed mechanical choice of law rules turning on the location
of selected elements of causes of action.").
68 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
69 See id. at 316.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
73 Reese, supra note 1, at 1592.
74 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
75 Id. at 15.
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guage. 76  Furthermore, Richards's requirement that a state have
"substantial contact" with the activity in question would seem to be
more stringent than International Shoe's "minimum contact"
requirement.
Meanwhile, lower courts have upheld extraterritorial legislation
based on the "effects doctrine," permitting it when the targeted for-
eign conduct has in-state effects and when a sufficient nexus exists
between those effects and the legislation's target. For example, Judge
Learned Hand declared it "settled law" that a state may impose liabil-
ity on foreign conduct that has in-state consequences.7 7 The Supreme
Court has approved the effects doctrine as well, although it has done
so with limited application in an international antitrust context.78
Two recent Supreme Court cases, BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore79 and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,8 0
have called into question the applicability of the effects doctrine as
regards domestic legislative jurisdiction. 81 However, commentators
disagree on these cases' place in the Court's jurisprudence. One
scholar argues that "the unbroken rejection of extraterritorial state-
enforced moralism for the first 150 years of the Republic retains rele-
vance,"8 2 while others suggest that BMW and State Farm incorrectly
adopt prior Court dicta and that current arguments advancing strict
territorialism are a sharp departure from accepted due process
principles.
83
76 See Reese, supra note 1, at 1592 n.28 (noting the efforts of Professors Weintraub
and Overton to extrapolate a principle from the Richards language regarding "substantial
contact").
77 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
78 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-70 (2004)
(applying a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of the extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. antitrust laws).
79 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
80 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
81 See Rostron, supra note 11, at 135-40 (discussing, in part, the significance of BMW
for strict territorialism and the effects doctrine).
82 Kreimer, supra note 16, at 980. Kreimer's article was written in response to an
article that categorized modern case law as a distinct departure from earlier due process
jurisprudence. See Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American
Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 855 (2002).
83 See Rostron, supra note 11, at 118-19. Rostron places the "resurrection of strict
territorialism" in the Court's 1982 decision Edgarv. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). Id. at
127. The Edgar plurality held that the Constitution "precludes the application of a state
statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not
the commerce has effects within the State." 457 U.S. at 642 (plurality opinion). Rostron
notes that the Edgar plurality located this extraterritoriality restriction in the Commerce
Clause but specified that the rule existed independently of the traditional Commerce
Clause balancing test. See Rostron, supra note 11, at 128. As a result, Rostron thus charac-
terizes the plurality's rule as "a strict prohibition against extraterritorial regulation." Id.
BMWcites Edgar, and the case undoubtedly contributed to the recent application of strict
territorialism discussed here. See id. at 137-38. However, this Note, which is focused on
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In BMW, the Court considered the constitutionality of a $2 mil-
lion punitive damages award imposed by an Alabama court against
BMW for the car manufacturer's failure to disclose defects in a car
that caused $4,000 in consequential damages to an Alabama citizen.8 4
In granting certiorari, the Court expressly aimed to announce a stan-
dard for unconstitutionally excessive damages,85 although the opinion
discusses the territoriality principle of legislative jurisdiction and
choice of law at length. 86 After highlighting principles of American
federalism, the Court concluded that "it is clear" that Alabama could
not impose via legislation its policy choices on the whole nation or on
neighboring states.
8 7
One may read the BMWCourt's discussion of extraterritorial leg-
islation as a harsh rebuke of the trial court for imposing severe puni-
tive damages that impermissibly considered BMW's activities outside
of Alabama. 88 Whatever the Court's motive, however, its reliance on
early cases that espoused strict territorialism calls into question the
continued validity of the effects principle in the realm of tort legisla-
tion.89 By stating that "Alabama does not have the power.., to pun-
ish BMW for conduct that was lawful [elsewhere] and that had no
impact on Alabama or its residents,"90 the Court appeared to affirm the
effects doctrine by negative implication. In other words, with this lan-
guage, the Court seemed to imply that Alabama might punish con-
duct that is lawful elsewhere if that conduct had a sufficient impact on
Alabama or its residents.
However, the Court's next statement in the opinion that "Ala-
bama [may not] impose sanctions on BMW in order to deter conduct that
states' prescriptive jurisdiction when enacting tort legislation, will primarily discuss BMW
and State Farm because they are more recent authority and because they deal specifically
with tort law. For a more extensive description of modern Supreme Court precedent advo-
cating strict territorialism, see id. at 127-40.
84 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 562-64.
85 See id. at 562-63.
86 See id. at 568-74.
87 See id. at 570-71. Alabama's policy would have required full disclosure of all
presale repairs to automobiles. See id.
88 See id. at 573-74. The Alabama Supreme Court declared such a punitive damages
calculus impermissible, though it only reduced the award from $4 million to $2 million.
See id. at 567.
89 One of the cases cited by the Court in BMWfor the extraterritoriality principle is
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). See BMW, 517 U.S. at 571 n.16. Bigelow addressed
the applicability of a state's law to its own citizen when the citizen engages in conduct in a
foreign jurisdiction that, while legal in the foreign jurisdiction, is illegal in the citizen's
home state. See id. at 822-24. The "effects" of the citizen's extraterritorial conduct are far
more remote in such a case. The two other cases cited for the extraterritoriality principle,
decided much earlier, were New York Life Insurance Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914) and
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892). See BMW 517 U.S. at 571 n.16.
90 Id. at 572-73 (emphasis added).
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is lawful in other jurisdictions"9 1 would seem to contradict such an inter-
pretation. This language suggests that a state legislature's intent is
more relevant to its legislative jurisdiction than an objective nexus in-
quiry into the effects that foreign conduct has within a state. Should
one take the position that tort law in part operates with the intent to
deter harmful conduct, the Court's latter sentence seems to flatly pro-
hibit a state from enacting legislation to protect its citizenry whenever
the legislation's targeted conduct occurs legally in a sister state, re-
gardless of in-state effects.
92
Seven years after BMW, the Court in State Farm reiterated that
states may not impose any sanction to deter out-of-state conduct that is
legal in the other state.9 3 Again addressing the constitutionality of
excessive punitive damages awards, the Court cited BMW and the
same series of early territoriality cases supporting BMW in order to
affirm territorial limits on states' legislative jurisdiction.94 The State
Farm Court went even further than BMW, however, declaring that, "as
a general rule, a State [does not] have a legitimate concern in impos-
ing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts commit-
ted outside of the State's jurisdiction."9 5 The Court's language
emphasizes the importance of a state legislature's intent and categori-
cally reduces a legislating state's interest to zero if it has some intent
to punish conduct that is lawful in sister states.
9 6
BMWand State Farm have given rise to the current confusion sur-
rounding legislative jurisdiction. 97 Despite International Shoe's mod-
ernizing effect on judicial jurisdiction and despite judicial approval of
the effects doctrine in certain legislative circumstances, BMWand State
Farm have called into question the extent to which the effects doctrine
applies in a domestic setting and whether a legislating state's subjec-
tive intent might defeat legislative jurisdiction regardless of the objec-
tive nexus between the legislating state and the targeted conduct.
91 Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
92 A state's ability to impose compensatory damages upon extraterritorial conduct was
not expressly decided by the BMWCourt. Rather, the Court addressed legislation aimed at
deterrence, see id. at 573-74, and has elsewhere contrasted punitive damages aimed at de-
terrence with compensatory damages aimed at redressing concrete loss. See, e.g., State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (citing Cooper Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001) and RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979)).
93 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421.
94 See id.; supra note 92.
95 Id.
96 See id.




THE PROBLEM As POSED By BERETTA
The Strict Liability Act (SLA) 98 sought to regulate extraterritorial
conduct that was legal in other states, although it limited recovery to
compensatory damages. 99 According to the SLA:
Any manufacturer, importer, or dealer of an assault weapon or
machine gun shall be held strictly liable in tort, without regard to
fault or proof of defect, for all direct and consequential damages
that arise from bodily injury or death if the bodily injury or death
proximately results from the discharge of the assault weapon or ma-
chine gun in the District of Columbia.1 0 0
The teeth of the SLA, beyond its imposition of strict liability, laid
in the breadth of the definitions it employed.' 0 ' The phrase "assault
weapon" referred to an enumerated list of products,10 2 while the
phrase "machine gun" included almost all semiautomatic firearms.
1 0 3
The D.C. Court of Appeals in affirming the constitutionality of the
statute noted that the D.C. legislature had drafted the SLA's broad
language so that it included "a class of weapons [that the D.C. Coun-
cil] found have little or no social benefit but at the same time [have]
pernicious consequences for the health and safety of District residents
and visitors."' 0 4 The manufacturers, on the other hand, argued that
the District of Columbia's broad definitions of "assault weapon" and
"machine gun" were far more inclusive than the federal definitions,
and thus created liability for widely used firearms that are "legal to
make, sell, and own in virtually every state in the nation."'
0 5
98 D.C. CODE §§ 7-2551.01-.03 (2001).
9 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421. Interestingly, the District of Columbia enacted the
SLA in 1990, and the Act lay unchallenged for ten years until the Beretta suit. See Dist. of
Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 872 A.2d 633 (D.C. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 399 (2005).
100 D.C. CODE § 7-2551.02.
101 See D.C. CODE § 7-2551.01; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 2.
102 See D.C. CODE § 7-2551.01.
103 See D.C. CODE § 7-2501.01(10) (defining "machine gun" as "any firearm which
shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily converted or restored to shoot: (A)
[a]utomatically, more than 1 shot by a single function of the trigger [or] (B)
[s]emiautomatically, more than 12 shots without manual reloading").
104 Beretta, 872 A.2d at 651.
105 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 3. In addition to invoking due
process concerns, the petitioners raised objections to the broad reach of the statute as a
part of their dormant Commerce Clause claim. The petitioners argued that while the SLA
purported to impose strict liability, it in fact imposed absolute liability because it did not
regard fault or defect. See id. Petitioners asserted that the onerous standard of liability,
coupled with the broad definitions encompassing almost all semiautomatic firearms, ex-
posed the manufacturers and distributors to such severe liability as to threaten the entire
industry. See id. at 17.
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It is likely that the D.C. legislature did not have any one motive in
mind when it drafted and passed the SLA, yet some of the Act's under-
lying purposes seem clear. Prior to enactment, the District of Colum-
bia had conducted extensive research on the issue of gun violence."
6
Based on its findings, the legislature decided to favor gun violence
victims over gun manufacturers. 10 7 In deciding that gun manufactur-
ers rather than victims should bear the social costs of gun violence,10 8
the District of Columbia was in effect projecting its policy choices
across state lines. 0 9 On the other hand, the D.C. Court of Appeals
emphasized the Act's intent of providing monetary redress to specific
individuals injured by firearms. 10 It is both logical and reasonable for
the D.C. legislature to have passed the SLA with the dual intent of
deterring the general use of firearms in the District of Columbia
(likely with the knowledge and perhaps even the intent that this might
deter lawful firearms manufacturing in sister states) and also allowing
monetary redress for gun violence victims. As this Note will demon-
strate, multipurpose legislation like the SLA poses analytical problems
under BMW and State Farm.
The high stakes riding on the outcome of Beretta may partially
explain its complicated procedural history. The case was first filed in
2000."' The plaintiffs included nine individuals injured by gun vio-
lence within the District of Columbia and the D.C. government." 2 In
2002, a trial judge in the D.C. Superior Court dismissed the case on
the pleadings, finding in part that the SLA was unconstitutional.1 3
On appeal roughly one-and-a-half years later, a three-judge panel of
the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal in part but reversed
the finding that the SLA was unconstitutional. 1 4 Both the plaintiffs
106 37 D.C. Reg. 8482, 8483 (1990).
107 See D.C. CODE § 2(2); 37 D.C. Reg. at 8483 (finding that the manufacture and sale
of assault weapons "expos[es] the citizens [of] and visitors to the District [of Columbia] to
a high degree of risk of serious harm" and "[a]s between the manufacturer or dealer of an
assault weapon on the one hand and the innocent victim on the other hand, the manufac-
turer or dealer is more at fault than the victim").
108 See 37 D.C. Reg. at 8483.
109 This was an essential argument mounted by the gun manufacturers who claimed
that such projections were contrary to State Farm and BMW See Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari, supra note 17, at 13. The manufacturers argued that the District of Columbia's choice
did indeed project its own policy across state lines because, as they claimed, the only way to
avoid crushing liability in the District would be to remove lawful handguns from the na-
tional market. See id.
110 See Dist. of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp, 872 A.2d 633, 652 (D.C. 2005) (en
banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 399 (2005).
I See id. at 637.
112 See id.
113 Dist. of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., No. Civ. A. 0428-00, 2002 VWrL 31811717,
at *44 (D.C. Super. Dec. 16, 2002) (declaring the SLA unconstitutional because it projects
the legislation of one state's regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another state).
114 847 A.2d 1127, 1129 (D.C. 2004).
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and defendants filed for a rehearing en banc," 51 5 and the entire panel
of the D.C. Court of Appeals issued the final judgment.1 16
In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs' negligence and public
nuisance claims, the court found that the SLA was neither an uncon-
stitutional violation of the dormant Commerce Clause nor, impor-
tantly for this Note, a violation of the Due Process Clause. 117 The
court began its due process analysis by quoting a 1933 Supreme Court
opinion that seemed to support the effects doctrine: "A person who
sets in motion in one State the means by which injury is inflicted in
another may, consistently with the due process clause, be made liable
for that injury whether the means employed be a responsible agent or
an irresponsible instrument."1 8 The court then emphasized the
SLA's limitation of liability to injuries occurring within the District of
Columbia's borders.
Because the manufacturers based their due process challenge on
BMWand State Farm,119 the court's rejection of their argument neces-
sarily distinguished those two cases.1 20 First, the court succinctly inter-
preted BMWs "due process link"' 2 1 as a prohibition on "punish [ing] a
person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do."' 22
This narrow reading of BAWsuggests that the D.C. Court of Appeals
was wary of the manufacturers' claim that BMWwas in fact a resurrec-
tion of strict territoriality. 2 3 Additionally, the court, in the context of
the SLA, seemed to take for granted the distinction between punitive
damages and compensatory damages addressed in BMW and State
Farm. 124 Without saying more, the court found that State Farm "made
[the distinction between punitive and compensatory damages] ex-
plicit," and thus brushed aside the petitioners' reliance on State Farm
as misapplied. 125
Although it is true that the Supreme Court in State Farm distin-
guished punitive damages from compensatory damages, 12 6 State Farm's
"general rule" that states may not impose punitive damages to deter
lawful foreign conduct would also seem to be applicable to compensa-
115 See 868 A.2d 858 (D.C. 2004) (per curiam).
1 16 Beretta, 872 A.2d at 633. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's denial of the
petitioners' request for a Writ of Certiorari, see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
This Part of the Note will focus on the D.C. Court of Appeals's due process analysis.
117 See Beretta, 872 A.2d at 656-59.
118 Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 258 (1933), quoted in Beretta, 872 A.2d at 658. Inter-
estingly, the Supreme Court did not cite this case in either BMW or State Farm.
119 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 13-15.
120 See Beretta, 872 A.2d at 658-59.
121 Id. at 659.
122 Id. (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 573 n.19 (1996)).
123 See id.
124 See id.; supra note 92.
125 See 872 A.2d at 659.
126 See supra note 92.
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tory damages if those damages were imposed for the purpose of deter-
ring conduct that is lawful elsewhere.' 27 Moreover, State Farm relied
heavily on BMW, which, though similarly addressing punitive dam-
ages, used broad language to prohibit states from imposing any sanc-
tion for the purpose of deterring conduct that is legal in other
states. '
2 3
While the D.C. Court of Appeals relied on State Farm's distinction
between punitive and compensatory damages, it implicitly affirmed
the D.C. legislature's policy findings regarding the harmful effects of
gun violence.1 29 If BMWand State Farm can truly be distinguished be-
cause they dealt with punitive damages only, then the D.C. Court of
Appeals might have been correct in upholding the SLA's constitution-
ality, and those cases would simply be inapt. However, the strong lan-
guage and general tenor of BMW and State Farm suggest that,
regardless of how damages are classified, states cannot legislate with
the intent to push their policy choices across state lines. 130 If this is
the case, then one might argue that the D.C. Court of Appeals should
have been more skeptical when analyzing the D.C. legislature's find-
ings and the intent underlying its enactment of the SLA, or at the
least should have been more concerned with sister states' interests. 131
Ultimately, the Beretta petitioners' due process argument failed to
convince the D.C. Court of Appeals. 32 But regardless of whether Ber-
etta was decided correctly, it seems likely that the court's affirmation of
the SLA-legislation that would likely deter conduct lawful in sister
states-runs counter to the spirit of BMW and State Farm. Moreover,
even if Beretta was correct in distinguishing BMW and State Farm be-
cause the SLA imposed compensatory, rather than punitive, damages,
it is unclear what kind of interest-balancing calculus should be em-
ployed to determine the constitutionality of similar, future legislation.
127 See supra text accompanying note 95. The D.C. Court of Appeals decision did not
emphasize this language from State Farm. See 872 A.2d at 659.
128 See supra text accompanying note 95.
129 See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
131 Twelve states filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioner gun manufacturers,
arguing that because the SLA was intended to control lawful commerce occurring entirely
within the borders of sister states, the SLA was unconstitutional and should be struck down
by the court. See Brief of the States of Utah et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
2, Beretta, U.S.A. Corp. v. Dist. of Columbia, 126 S. Ct. 399 (2005) (mem.) (No. 05-118),
2005 WL 2034939.
132 See 872 A.2d 633, 659 (D.C. 2005) ("[N] o due process issue is raised by legislation
that seeks to redress injuries suffered by District residents and visitors resulting from the





THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONFUSION IN THE COURTS
AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
In the wake of BMW and State Farm, states are unsure of their
ability to redress concrete loss through tort legislation. In addition,
product manufacturers are unsure of the validity of foreign statutes
that would expose them to significant liability. The D.C. Court of Ap-
peals' seemingly inconsistent interpretation of BMW and State Farm is
not an isolated occurrence. 133 For instance, in a California appellate
court case in which a non-California resident claimed damages under
a California employment discrimination statute, the court purposely
avoided "serious constitutional concerns" by construing the state stat-
ute to not grant compensatory damages for extraterritorial
conduct.134
While some lower courts have interpreted BMW as invalidating
extraterritorial legislation on dormant Commerce Clause grounds,
others simply continue to apply the same effects-based legislative juris-
diction analysis that BMW and State Farm called into question. 135 The
Beretta petitioners, on the other hand, called for a substantial depar-
ture from prior balancing approaches and asked the U.S. Supreme
Court to "dispel the confusion by holding that the per se ban on direct
regulation of out-of-state commerce applies to all types of statutes with
extraterritorial reach."
13 6
One way to resolve these issues would be to adopt the Beretta peti-
tioners' position and affirm strict territoriality. 137 This approach
would find its legs in BMW and State Farm, which arguably proscribe
any imposition of one state's policy decisions upon sister states. 138
133 See Rostron, supra note 11, at 140 ("The Supreme Court's decisions have charted
no clear path for other courts to follow. Lower courts have applied the strict territorial
rule in haphazard fashion, usually based on assumptions about its relevance rather than
any form of analysis, and have not been able to draw any clear or consistent line as to
which forms of state law should be allowed to reach out-of-state conduct with in-state ef-
fects."). See id. at 140-47 (surveying the confusion in lower court decisions on the issue of
legislative jurisdiction).
134 See Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
135 For a sample of such cases, see Rostron, supra note 11, at 142 n.151. Among others,
Rostron cites Jaurequi v. John Deere Co., 986 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1993), which allowed Missouri
to apply its products liability law to an Illinois manufacturer who sold the product to an
Indiana dealer); In re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 750 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mich. 1989),
which allowed Michigan to apply its punitive damages law to actions performed by a Mis-
souri airplane manufacturer that took place in California, Feldt v. Stumn, Ruger & Co., 721 F.
Supp. 403 (D. Conn. 1989), which upheld the application of Georgia products liability law
to a Connecticut manufacturer who sold a firearm to an Illinois distributor that sold it to
an Illinois dealer.
136 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 21.
137 See id.
138 See supra notes 79-97 and accompanying text.
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This approach would abdicate use of the effects doctrine entirely and
require invalidation of all legislation reaching extraterritorial conduct
regardless of the impact the conduct has on the legislating state.
However, some scholars criticize this approach as a misapplication of
precedent and an improper upheaval of the current principles gov-
erning choice of law. 139 Furthermore, this approach arguably violates
principles of federalism by assigning no weight to the legislating
state's interests and by preventing a state from exercising its police
power to protect its citizenry.
This Note argues that despite the Beretta petitioners' construction
of BMWand State Farm, Professor Reese's two-fold due process inquiry
is both legal and preferable.1 40 As a practical matter, it simply cannot
be the case that, in today's busy interstate marketplace, a state has
absolutely no legislative power to award its citizens compensatory re-
dress for concrete loss suffered within its borders. 141 As a legal matter,
the need for effects-based legislation has been recognized by the U.S.
Supreme Court in an international antitrust context 142 and accepted
by lower courts in domestic contexts. 143  Furthermore, Professor
Reese's approach would be the logical outgrowth of International
Shoe's "minimum contacts" test as it applies to judicial jurisdiction.
144
Support for Reese's approach can also be found in the Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which enumerates specific
factors to consider in each step of a legislative jurisdiction inquiry. 45
Specifically, the Restatement takes the position that "a state may exer-
cise jurisdiction based on effects in the state, when the effect or in-
tended effect is substantial and the exercise of jurisdiction is
139 See, e.g., Rostron, supra note 11, at 116 ("[The Supreme Court's statements regard-
ing legislative jurisdiction in recent cases] hark back to a conception of state authority that
prevailed throughout the law a century ago but appeared to be dead until the Supreme
Court's recent comments revived it. The statements have no support in modern prece-
dent, they arose in part from a Supreme Court opinion's error in citation of authority, and
they cannot be correct without rendering unconstitutional a vast number of the products
liability and other tort claims that courts hear every day.").
140 See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
141 Cf Puurunen, supra note 4, at 689 (discussing ways in which recent technological
innovations in international electronic commerce have challenged legal paradigms to
"measure up with societal goals"). This is because, as Justice William J. Brennan noted in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the interstate flow of people and commerce has
become so ubiquitous that to prevent states from protecting their citizens against foreign
actors who utilize the flow of commerce would nearly extinguish the states' protective pow-
ers. See 444 U.S. 286, 309 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-70 (2004).
143 See, e.g., supra note 135.
144 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) ("[T]he Due Process
Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that
have been voluntarily assumed."); supra note 72 and accompanying text.




reasonable under § 403."146 Section 403 lists eight factors relevant to
the reasonableness inquiry, including the nexus between the activity
and the territory of the legislating state, the connections between the
legislating state and the principally regulated community, the charac-
ter of the regulated activity and the legislation itself, the impact the
legislation would have on justified expectations (if the conduct is legal
where it is performed), the impact the legislation would have in the
broader interstate context, and the interests of other states in regulat-
ing or not regulating the targeted conduct.
147
While the Restatement identifies particular factors relevant to
Reese's two-fold inquiry, its list of reasonableness factors is not exhaus-
tive, and it does not assign any weight to the factors provided. 148 The
only discussion of the weight of interests is in § 403 (3), which declares
that when two states would not be unreasonable in exercising legisla-
tive jurisdiction over particular conduct, and those two states' interests
conflict, "a state should defer to the other state if that state's interest is
clearly greater."'
149
Beretta provides an example of a case in which it would be difficult
to determine whose interests are "clearly greater" under § 403. The
District of Columbia, based on its findings, asserted that it had a press-
ing interest in redressing the epidemic of gun violence plaguing it.15
°
The gun manufacturers, and the states where they do business,
claimed that enforcement of the SLA would cause a halt to lawful busi-
ness and have dire economic consequences.' 51
In all likelihood, no formula could ever definitively resolve
thorny federalism questions like those raised in Beretta. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court could provide authoritative guidance on how
lower courts should analyze these issues. For instance, the Court
might resolve whether the Due Process Clause is to be given similar
construction in both the legislative and judicial jurisdiction contexts.
Additionally, the Court might weigh in on the relevance of Restate-
ment § 403 to domestic issues of legislative jurisdiction and help as-
sign weight to the individual reasonableness factors. Doing so would
enable courts to more uniformly address issues of legislative jurisdic-
tion, give greater guidance to state legislatures seeking to enact tort
legislation, and provide some measure of predictability to product
146 Id. § 402 cmt. d.
147 See id. § 403.
148 See id. § 403 cmt. b ("The list of considerations in Subsection (2) is not exhaustive.
No priority or other significance is implied in the order in which the factors are listed. Not
all considerations have the same importance in all situations; the weight to be given to any
particular factor or group of factors depends on the circumstances.").
149 See id. § 403(3).
150 See supra note 107.
151 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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manufacturers who question whether they will be subject to foreign
liability. Until the Court does so, it will remain unclear whether prod-
uct manufacturers may successfully raise arguments similar to those
raised in Beretta, and courts will continue to uphold or strike down
state legislation in a patchwork fashion.
CONCLUSION
In contemporary society, it is not uncommon for foreign conduct
to adversely affect a state's residents. Although states have a duty to
enact legislation that protects their citizens, the extent to which they
may do so in a manner that targets foreign conduct with in-state ef-
fects is unclear. Recent Supreme Court cases have been cast as a revi-
val of strict territorialism, which prohibits a state from enacting any
legislation with extraterritorial application. While it is clear that
states' prescriptive authority is limited, as argued in this Note by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is impracticable
and unwise to restrict state legislatures in such an absolute fashion.
Furthermore, applying such restrictive principles seems to violate
principles of federalism.
152
Although the effects doctrine is a viable alternative that would
facilitate a principled analysis of extraterritorial legislation, its consti-
tutional parameters remain inadequately defined. Professor Reese's
two-fold due process inquiry, 153 which the Restatement's list of factors
complements, 15 4 provides helpful tools for framing due process chal-
lenges to extraterritorial legislation. Even so, gaps in the analysis re-
main. In particular, the Supreme Court should address two issues.
First, how attenuated can the link be between foreign conduct and in-
state effects for there to be an insufficient jurisdictional nexus? Sec-
ond, how should a state balance its interests against the competing
interests of its sister states?
While the Beretta manufacturers must themselves be satisfied with
the resolution that Congress afforded them,155 the challenges they
raised may have a significant impact on states, their legislatures and
citizens, as well as product manufacturers well into the future. At pre-
sent, state legislatures' ability to enact tort legislation imposing com-
pensatory damages on extraterritorial conduct having in-state effects
is unclear and warrants authoritative treatment.
152 See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing § 403's recognition of the
interest a legislating state may have in regulating extraterritorial conduct).
153 See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
154 See supra text accompanying note 147.
155 See supra note 23.
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